Coercive Control: An Offence But Not a Defence: R v Challen [2019] EWCA Crim 916, Court of Appeal by Storey, Tony
Northumbria Research Link
Citation: Storey, Tony (2019) Coercive Control: An Offence But Not a Defence: R v Challen [2019] 
EWCA Crim 916, Court of Appeal. Journal of Criminal Law, 83 (6). pp. 513-515. ISSN 0022-0183 
Published by: SAGE
URL: https://doi.org/10.1177/0022018319889168 <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022018319889168>
This  version  was  downloaded  from  Northumbria  Research  Link: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/id/eprint/45572/
Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to access 
the University’s research output. Copyright © and moral rights for items on NRL are retained by the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  Single copies of full items can be reproduced, 
displayed or performed, and given to third parties in any format or medium for personal research or 
study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, provided the authors, 
title and full bibliographic details are given, as well as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata 
page. The content must not be changed in any way. Full items must not be sold commercially in any  
format or medium without formal permission of the copyright holder.  The full policy is available online: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/pol  i cies.html  
This  document  may differ  from the  final,  published version of  the research  and has been made 
available online in accordance with publisher policies. To read and/or cite from the published version 
of the research, please visit the publisher’s website (a subscription may be required.)
                        
Coercive Control: An offence but not a defence 
 
R v Challen [2019] EWCA Crim 916, Court of Appeal 
 
Murder; Manslaughter; Diminished responsibility; Loss of Control 
 
In August 2010, Sally Challen (C), then aged 56, killed her 61-year-old husband, Richard 
Challen (R), with at least twenty blows of a hammer at their family home in Surrey. They had 
been married for 31 years but R had been ‘unfaithful on several occasions’ which had 
caused C ‘considerable distress’. Eventually, in 2009, C moved out of the family home and 
began divorce proceedings. However, C found it ‘difficult to cope’ with the situation and in 
June 2010 proposed a reconciliation, to which R agreed. Shortly afterwards, she rescinded 
the decree nisi which had been obtained by this point in time, and the couple agreed to sell 
the family home and go to Australia for six months.  
 
Nevertheless, C remained suspicious about R’s relationships with other women. On the 
fateful day, C and R had met at the family home to clear out the house and garage in 
advance of their overseas trip. In the afternoon, C went out to buy food but on her return she 
noticed that the phone had been moved. She dialed the last-called number and realised that 
R had rung another woman. C proceeded to prepare lunch but whilst R was eating she 
produced a hammer that she had brought with her and killed him. C then left the family home 
and returned to her own property where she spent the night. The next day she called her 
cousin and said she was at Beachy Head in East Sussex. The cousin called the police and a 
chaplain, who arrived just as C was walking towards the cliff edge. Over the next four hours 
she told a police negotiator that she felt like R had treated her ‘appallingly badly’ over the 
years and that she was ‘very depressed’. Eventually she agreed to leave the cliff edge and 
was arrested. C was charged with murder and appeared before HHJ Critchlow and a jury at 
Guildford Crown Court in June 2011.  
 
At trial, C pleaded guilty to manslaughter on grounds of diminished responsibility. This was 
based on depression (she had first visited a doctor in 2004 after discovering her husband’s 
infidelity and had been prescribed anti-depressant medication in 2008). She did not argue 
the defence of provocation (subsequently abolished by the entry into force of s.56 of the 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 in October 2010, but which was still available at the time of 
the killing) but HHJ Critchlow left it to the jury alongside diminished responsibility. The jury 
rejected both defences and C was convicted of murder. She was sentenced to life 
imprisonment with a minimum specified period of 22 years. An appeal against sentence was 
allowed and the minimum term was reduced to 18 years (Challen [2011] EWCA Crim 2919). 
 
Several years later, C appealed on the basis of fresh psychiatric evidence which had been 
unavailable at the time of the trial. Leave to appeal was granted in March 2018 (Challen 
[2018] EWCA Crim 471). At the appeal, it was contended that this fresh evidence suggested 
that C had a borderline personality disorder and a severe mood disorder (specifically, bipolar 
affective disorder), at the time of the killing. It was further contended that the fresh evidence 
revealed that C was the victim of R’s controlling behaviour during their marriage. This latter 
argument was supported by, inter alia, the couple’s adult sons, David and James Challen, 
and C’s cousin, who said that during their marriage R ‘pulled the strings’ and C ‘danced’. 
This evidence was potentially more significant given that ‘controlling or coercive behaviour’ 
in the context of two people who are ‘personally connected’ had become a criminal offence 
under s.76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015.  
 
There were two, separate but related, grounds of appeal. (1) The fresh evidence showed 
that C had been suffering an ‘abnormality of mind’ at the time of the killing; (2) the evidence 
of R’s coercive and controlling behaviour supported the defence of provocation, in that it 
would have affected the gravity of R’s conduct towards C. It was contended that, had this 
evidence been available at the trial, the jury may have accepted diminished responsibility 
and/or provocation, rendering C’s murder conviction unsafe.  
 
HELD, allowing the appeal, that the conviction was unsafe and should be quashed and a 
retrial ordered. This was explicitly based on the evidence relating to C’s personality and 
mood disorders, and not the evidence of R’s controlling behaviour. Hallett LJ, giving the 
unanimous judgment of the Court of Appeal, said that the court had ‘focused’ on evidence 
that C ‘suffers from borderline personality disorder and a severe mood disorder, probably 
bipolar affective disorder, and suffered from those disorders at the time of the killing’.  
 
On the relevance of coercive and controlling behaviour, Hallett LJ accepted that ‘there are 
sufficient independent and contemporaneous references to the possibility of [C] having been 
controlled by [R] to support the proposition that she was in an abusive relationship’. 
However, she added that ‘these are not issues for us to determine. We express no view on 
whether [C] was the victim of coercive control and no view, if she was a victim, on the extent 
to which it impacted upon her ability to exercise self-control or her responsibility for her 
actions’. Hallett LJ also emphasised that ‘it is important to remember that coercive control as 
such is not a defence to murder’ and that ‘coercive control is only relevant in the context’ of 
other defences, namely diminished responsibility and provocation. 
 
Postscript: C was due to face a retrial at the Old Bailey in July 2019. However, in June 2019, 
the Crown accepted a plea of guilty to manslaughter on grounds of diminished responsibility. 
C, now aged 65, was sentenced to nine years and four months – the time she had already 
served – and was ‘therefore entitled by law to be released at once’. 
 
Commentary 
The present case is more important for what it doesn’t decide than what it actually does 
decide. The Court of Appeal ultimately allowed C’s appeal by reference to the fresh evidence 
of her suffering from borderline personality disorder and bipolar affective disorder. The Court 
was at pains to point out that coercive control was not a defence to murder and could only 
have relevance in the context of other defences. This was despite the fact that much of the 
media coverage of the appeal focused on R’s behaviour towards C during their marriage 
(“Fear led our mother to kill our father. It wasn’t murder”, The Observer, 17th February 2019; 
“New coercive control laws under spotlight in hammer killing appeal”, The Guardian, 27th 
February 2019; “The Sally Challen appeal will give hope to abused women”, The New 
Statesman, 1st March 2019). 
 
Rather than establishing an important new precedent, the present case is instead evocative 
– both factually and legally – of a case from more than twenty years’ ago, Hobson [1998] 1 
Cr. App. R. 31. At Liverpool Crown Court in October 1992, Kathleen Hobson (H) had been 
charged with murdering her abusive and alcoholic partner, James McDonald, by stabbing 
him to death. Her defence at trial, self-defence, was rejected by the jury, as was provocation, 
which had been left to the jury by the trial judge. H was convicted of murder and sentenced 
to life imprisonment. Several years later, H appealed, contending that fresh evidence had 
emerged subsequent to her trial showing that she had been suffering from Battered Woman 
Syndrome (BWS), a ‘variant of post-traumatic stress disorder’, at the time of the killing. 
Moreover, BWS had been recognised as a ‘disease’ in 1994, which meant that it satisfied 
the requirement for diminished responsibility at the time (under s. 2(1) of the Homicide Act 
1957, prior to its amendment by s. 52 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009) that an 
‘abnormality of mind’ be ‘induced by disease or injury’. H contended that her conviction was 
therefore unsafe. Her appeal was allowed, her murder conviction was quashed and a retrial 
ordered. 
 
Thus, both Hobson and Challen involved women killing their abusive male partners. Both 
women were convicted of murder after their chosen defence (and provocation) was rejected. 
Both spent several years in prison before having their convictions quashed and retrials 
ordered on the basis that fresh psychiatric evidence, unavailable at the time of the trial, 
supported a defence of diminished responsibility.  
 
Plus ça change. Or do they? One potentially significant development since the killings of 
James McDonald and Richard Challen is the abolition of provocation in October 2010. 
Would its replacement, loss of control under s.54 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, 
have made any difference had it been available to Kathleen Hobson and Sally Challen? That 
defence poses three hurdles for the defence to overcome (or, more accurately, three 
opportunities for the Crown to disprove it). The first is the requirement in s.54(1)(a) that the 
accused suffer a loss of self-control, albeit not necessarily suddenly (s.54(2)). The second is 
the need for a qualifying trigger (s.54(1)(b)). In cases like Hobson, where physical violence 
from the deceased was frequent, the trigger could be that contained in s.55(3), where D’s 
loss of self-control ‘was attributable to D’s fear of serious violence from V against D’. In 
cases like Challen, where the abuse was psychological rather than physical, the trigger in 
s.55(4) would be more apposite, i.e. where there were ‘things done or said (or both) which 
constituted circumstances of an extremely grave character, and caused D to have a 
justifiable sense of being seriously wronged’.  
 
The third and final requirement is that ‘a person of D’s sex and age, with a normal degree of 
tolerance and self-restraint and in the circumstances of D, might have reacted in the same or 
in a similar way to D’ (s.54(1)(c)). In the present case, that would presumably entail asking 
whether a ‘normal’ 57-year old woman in Sally Challen’s circumstances might have taken a 
hammer (or another weapon) to the head of her unfaithful, controlling husband. That begs at 
least one question: would the ‘circumstances’ include C’s borderline personality disorder and 
bipolar affective disorder? The answer is probably ‘no’, on the basis of s. 54(3), which 
stipulates that ‘the reference to ‘the circumstances of D’ is a reference to all of D’s 
circumstances other than those whose only relevance to D’s conduct is that they bear on D’s 
general capacity for tolerance or self-restraint’. The evidence would therefore have to 
suggest that one or both disorders had a significance beyond the ‘general’. In Rejmanski; 
Gassman [2017] EWCA Crim 2061; [2018] 1 WLR 2721, post-traumatic stress disorder and 
emotionally unstable personality disorder, respectively, were deemed to have no such 
significance. 
